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Abstract
We analyze the problem of preventing biological invasions caused by ships transporting
internationally traded goods between countries and continents. Specifically, we ask the following
question: Should a port manager have a small number of inspectors inspect arriving ships less
stringently or should this manager have a large number of inspectors inspect the same ships more
stringently? We use a simple queuing-theoretic framework and show that if decreasing the economic
cost of regulation is very important then it makes more sense for the port manager to choose the less
stringent inspection regime. In contrast, if reducing the damage from biological invasions is more
salient then the port manager ought to pick the more stringent inspection regime. 
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As Batabyal and Beladi (2004) have noted, the primary method of marine alien species introduction is through the dumping of
ballast water. Cargo ships generally carry ballast water in order to increase vessel stability when they are not carrying full loads.
When these ships come into port, this ballast water must be discharged before cargo can be loaded. It is estimated that over 4000
species of invertebrates, algae, and fishes are being moved around the world in ship ballast tanks every day. Consider the case of
Canada. It has been estimated that as much as 13 billion gallons or 50 million metric tonnes of overseas ballast water enters
Canadian coastal ports every year. A recent analysis by the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center (SERC) in Edgewater,
Maryland computed that a liter of ballast water generally contains several billion organisms similar to viruses and up to 800 million




Maritime trade accounts for a significant proportion of total international trade in the world.
Ships are the key vehicle in maritime trade and, today, ships are commonly used to transport a whole
host of goods between different countries. It is certainly true that international trade in goods is
beneficial to the nations involved in such trade. This notwithstanding, as Heywood (1995) and Parker
et al. (1999) have pointed out, in addition to transporting goods between countries, ships have also
managed to transport—in their ballast water—a variety of alien plant and animal species from one
geographical region to another.
5 These alien species have frequently succeeded in invading their new
habitats and the ensuing biological invasions have turned out to be extremely costly to the nations in
which these novel habitats are located. For the United States alone, the dollar value of these costs is
staggering. Here are two examples. First, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) has
estimated that the Russian wheat aphid caused $600 million worth of crop damage between 1987 and
1989. Second and more generally, Pimentel et al. (2000) have approximated the total costs of all non-
native species at around $137 billion per year. 
As noted by Perrault and Muffett (2002) and Settle and Shogren (2004), invasive species give
rise to economic costs and to biological damage. For instance, Vitousek et al. (1996) have shown that
alien species can change ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and decrease biological3
diversity. Further, Cox (1993) has pointed out that out of 256 vertebrate extinctions with a known
cause, 109 are the result of biological invasions. In other words, biological invasions have often been
a great threat to society. 
Although social scientists have, very recently, recognized the salience of the problem of
biological invasions, it is still true that “the economics of the problem has...attracted little attention”
(Perrings et al. (2000, p. 11)). Consequently, our knowledge of the economics of biological invasions
in general and the regulation of biological invasions in particular is very incomplete. Now, from a
regulatory standpoint, there are several actions that a regulator can take to grapple with the problem
of biological invasions. Following Batabyal and Beladi (2004), it is helpful to separate these actions
into pre-invasion and post-invasion actions. The point of taking pre-invasion actions is to prevent
alien species from invading a novel habitat. Therefore, the reader should think of pre-invasion actions
as essentially preventive in nature. In contrast, post-invasion actions involve the optimal control of
an alien species, given that this species has already invaded a novel habitat.
The small extant literature on the economics of biological invasions has, for the most part,
addressed the desirability of actions in the post-invasion scenario. Here are four examples of such
studies. First, Barbier (2001) has shown that the economic effect of a biological invasion can be
ascertained by analyzing the nature of the interaction between the alien and the native species. He
points out that the economic effect depends on whether this interaction involves interspecific
competition or dispersion. Second, Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) have analyzed an intertemporal
model of alien species stock management. They demonstrate that the optimal level of management
effort is responsive to ecological factors that are not only species and site specific but also random.
Third, Olson and Roy (2002) have used a probabilistic framework to investigate the conditions under4
which it is optimal to wipe out the alien species and conditions under which it is not optimal to do
so. Finally, Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) have shown that in some situations, it is possible to use
information furnished by experts to develop a model in which it is optimal to not decimate but instead
control the spread of an invasive species.
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have theoretically studied the prevention
problem, that is, the regulation of a potentially damaging alien species before invasion. These two
papers are Horan et al. (2002) and Batabyal and Beladi (2004). There are two key differences
between our paper and Horan et al. (2002). First, we do not compare the attributes of management
strategies under full information and under uncertainty. Second, we use a simple queuing-theoretic
framework to shed light on the properties of two inspection regimes that embody different ideas
about the economic cost from regulatory activities. 
Batabyal and Beladi (2004) is the paper that is most closely related to ours. This paper studies
optimization problems arising from the steady state analysis of two multi-person inspection regimes.
Although this paper does say something about alternate inspection regimes, it does not address the
following cental question that we analyze in the present paper: When attempting to prevent a
biological invasion by inspecting the ballast water of ships, is it a better idea for a port manager to
have a small number of inspectors inspect arriving ships less stringently or should this manager have
a large number of inspectors inspect the same arriving ships more stringently? We use a simple
queuing-theoretic framework to show that the answer to the above question depends on the port
manager’s criterion function. In particular, we focus on two different criteria and show that in one
case it makes more sense to have a small number of inspectors inspect arriving ships less stringently
and in the other case it is more advantageous to have a large number of inspectors inspect arriving6
Wolff (1989), Taylor and Karlin (1998), and Ross (2003) contain fine textbook accounts of queuing theory.
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ships more stringently. The reader should note that the basic question that we are addressing in this
paper is entirely consistent with the agenda for research on the regulation of invasive species recently
proposed by Batabyal (2004).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first provides a primer on queuing
theory and then it describes the two queuing-theoretic models that we use to analyze the choice of
inspection regime question facing our port manager. Section 3 first focuses on the “average wait of
a ship in the port system” or   criterion for our port manager and then this section analyzes the AWS
relative desirability of the two queuing-theoretic inspection regimes described in section 2. Section 4
first focuses on the “average wait of a ship in queue” or   criterion for our port manager and then AWQ
this section undertakes the same analysis as in section 3. Section 5 concludes and offers suggestions
for future research on the subject of this paper.
2. Queuing Theory and the Choice of Inspection Regime 
2.1. A primer on queuing theory
The purpose of queuing theory is to mathematically analyze waiting lines or queues.
6 At an
elementary level, all queuing models have three attributes. Specifically, they can be delineated by (i)
a random arrival process, (ii) a probabilistic service time distribution function, and (iii) the
deterministic number of available servers. In the queuing models of this paper, the arrival process is
the Poisson process. In this case, the times between successive arrivals are exponentially distributed
and the exponential distribution is memoryless. Therefore, the Poisson arrival process is routinely
described by the letter M.7
It should be noted that different modeling techniques involve different cross space and time variation features for the underlying
physical processes and the associated uncertainties. 
6
The service times are obviously random and hence these times can, in principle, be arbitrarily
distributed. However, in the queuing models of this paper, these services times are exponentially
distributed and hence they are also memoryless. Hence, once again, the letter   is used to symbolize M
the service time distribution functions. Finally, the non-stochastic number of servers is typically
denoted by some positive integer. 
Now, consistent with the approach taken in Batabyal (2004) and Batabyal and Beladi (2004),
the first inspection regime that we analyze corresponds to the   queuing model and the second M/M/1
inspection regime that we study corresponds to the   queuing model. The reader should note M/M/2
that in both these tripartite representations, we are referring to inspection regimes in which the arrival
process of ships is Poisson, the time it takes to inspect a ship is exponentially distributed, and the
number of inspectors equals either one or two.
7 
2.2. A stylized depiction of biological invasions
Consider a stylized, publically owned port in a particular coastal region of some country. Ships
with ballast water arrive at this port to load cargo and to then carry this cargo to some other port. On
occasion, ships that come into our port with ballast water will first unload cargo and then load new
cargo for shipment to some other port in the world. In either case, the arrival of these ships coincides
with the arrival of a whole host of possibly injurious biological organisms. We assume that the arrival
rate of these biological organisms is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships. As such, we shall not
model these biological organisms directly. Instead, we shall focus on the ships that bring these
organisms to our port by means of their ballast water. The arrival process of the ships in our port7
represents the arrival process for the queuing-theoretic inspection regimes that we analyze in this
paper. Now, consistent with the discussion in the last paragraph of section 2.1, we assume that the
ships in question arrive at our port in accordance with a Poisson process with rate β.
The manager of our port is interested in precluding invasions by the possibly injurious
biological organisms. Therefore, arriving ships must be inspected before they can either load or unload
cargo. In the first model that we analyze, our port has a single inspector and in the second model that
we focus on, our port has two inspectors. This means that at any particular point in time, our port will
be able to simultaneously inspect either one or two ships. Ships are inspected on a first-come-first-
served basis. If more than one or two ships arrive at our port during a particular time interval then the
ships that are not already being inspected must wait in queue. The reader should think of this
description as follows: Our port has either one or two docks and one inspector is assigned to a dock.
Hence, at any particular point in time, a maximum of either one or two ships can be docked and
inspected. The port system consists of ships that are being inspected, ships that are waiting in queue,
the one or two inspectors, and the port manager.
Given that we are studying the prevention of biological invasions, ideally, our port manager
would like the inspectors to have a zero tolerance policy. However, such a policy may be very costly
to implement. As such, we suppose that our port manager is confronted with a choice between two
scenarios. In the first scenario, the manager has one inspector inspect the ballast water of arriving ships
not very stringently. In the second scenario, this manager has two inspectors inspect the ballast water
of arriving ships more stringently. Examples of activities that an inspector might undertake include (i)
the shipboard filtration of ballast water, (ii) the treatment of ballast water with heat, chemicals, and
ultraviolet radiation, and (iii) the shore based treatment of ballast water. 8
Inspections generally require varying amounts of time. For example, if an inspector knows that
a particular ship has taken on ballast water in an area where there are no known biological invaders
then he may be able to clear a ship relatively speedily. In contrast, if a specific ship has taken on ballast
water during a phytoplankton bloom, then the probability that this ship’s ballast water will contain
injurious organisms is much higher, and hence more time will be required to clear this ship. The upshot
of this discussion is that the inspection times—and hence the stringency of inspections—are random
variables. Given this state of affairs, we now make the following two assumptions regarding the
stringency of inspections. In the first scenario of the previous paragraph, our single inspector inspects
arriving ships at rate   where   is a positive constant. In the second scenario of the previous 2γ, γ
paragraph, the two inspectors inspect arriving ships at rate   A faster rate of inspection implies lower γ.
stringency and a slower rate of inspection implies higher stringency. Therefore, the inspection regime
of the first scenario is less stringent than the inspection regime of the second scenario because 2γ>γ.
We now have all the necessary parts of our two queuing-theoretic inspection regimes. Using
the language of queuing theory, the first or less stringent inspection regime is a   model with M/M/1
inspection rate   and the second or more stringent inspection regime is a   model with 2γ M/M/2
inspection rate   The reader should note the way in which we have mathematically characterized the γ.
cental question of this paper: When attempting to prevent a biological invasion by inspecting the
ballast water of ships, is it a better idea for a port manager to have a single inspector inspecting
arriving ships at rate   or should this manager have two inspectors inspecting the same ships at rate  2γγ ?
We now proceed to the theoretical discussion of the two queuing-theoretic inspection regimes for the
case in which our port manager focuses on the “average wait of a ship in the port system” or AWS
criterion.9
3. The AWS Criterion
Inspection activities that result in the prevention of a biological invasion by alien plant or
animal species clearly result in benefits to the citizens of the coastal region under consideration.
However, during the time that arriving ships are being inspected, there is in particular no loading or
unloading of cargo, and hence in general, economic activity resulting from maritime trade is at a
standstill. This temporary stoppage of economic activities imposes costs on the economy of our coastal
region and one way to proxy this cost is to suppose that this cost is directly proportional to the
average wait of a ship in the port system. In this way of looking at the problem, the longer (shorter)
this average wait in the port system or   the larger (smaller) the costs from the suspension of AWS,
economic activities. Therefore, in having inspectors inspect arriving ships for potentially injurious
biological organisms, our port manager will want to keep   as low as possible. Now, in the rest AWS
of this section, we suppose that our port manager has this   (proxy for economic cost) criterion AWS
in mind when he is choosing between the less stringent and the more stringent inspection regimes. 
3.1. M/M/2 inspection regime
Let us now calculate   for the   inspection regime with inspection rate   We AWS M/M/2 γ.
proceed by means of three steps. First, we explain the notion of a stationary probability. To this end,
let   denote the total number of ships in our port at time   Then, we define   to be Z(t) t. Pn, n$0
(1) Pn/limt64Prob{Z(t)'n}.
In words,   is the long run or stationary probability that there are exactly   ships in our port system. Pn n
The second step requires us to set up and solve the so called balance equations. Now,






Let   Then, following the above cited procedure, it can be shown that the solutions to the ψ'β/γ.
balance equations (2)-(4) are   In words, the stationary or long run or limiting probability Pn'ψn/2n&1P0.
that there are   ships in our port system is a multiplicative function of the stationary probability that n
there are zero ships in this port system. Now, it should be clear to the reader that   This last 3
n'4
n'0Pn'1.






Note that equation (5) above only makes sense when   Because   this means that we must 2$ψ. ψ'β/γ,
have 2γ$β.
Third, now that we know the   we can calculate the average number of ships in our port Pn,







Now, having determined the expected number of ships in our port system, we can ascertain the
average wait of a ship in our port system or   by using a well known result in queuing theory. This AWS8
This result is important because it relates two important metrics in queuing models, i.e., the average queue size and the average
customer waiting time in the stationary state. In the context of our paper, the average queue size is the average number of ships in
our port system and the average customer waiting time is our AWS criterion.
11
result—see Taylor and Karlin (1998, p. 542)—tells us that 




This completes our three step derivation of the   criterion for the   inspection regime. We AWS M/M/2
now derive the same criterion for the   inspection regime. M/M/1
3.2. M/M/1 inspection regime
The derivation of the   criterion for the   inspection regime is considerably simpler. AWS M/M/1
In particular, to obtain the criterion we seek, we shall modify a result stated in Taylor and Karlin




Given equations (7) and (8), we now proceed to discuss the central question of this paper for the AWS
criterion.
3.3. Discussion
When seeking to prevent a biological invasion by inspecting the ballast water of ships, is it a
better idea for a port manager to have a small number of inspectors inspect arriving ships less
stringently or should this manager have a large number of inspectors inspect the same arriving ships
more stringently? Our model of a small number of inspectors inspecting arriving ships less stringently12
is the   regime with inspection rate   Similarly, our model of a large number of inspectors M/M/1 2γ.
inspecting arriving ships more stringently is the   regime with inspection rate   Consequently, M/M/2 γ.
we are now in a position to answer the above question for the   criterion. AWS
Let us suppose that for the   inspection regime, the condition   holds. That is, the M/M/1 β<2γ
denominator of the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (8) is positive. In words, this simply means that
our queuing-theoretic inspection regime is stable. Now,   implies that   and this inequality β<2γβ %2γ<4γ
tells us that   This last inequality and equations (7) and (8) together tell us that 1<{4γ/(β%2γ)}.
 Hence, we can now state AWSM/M/1<AWSM/M/2.
PROPOSITION 1:   is lower when our port manager chooses a small number of inspectors to AWS
inspect arriving ships less stringently.
Note that if one finds the queue empty in the   inspection regime then it would not be M/M/2
beneficial to have two inspectors. Instead, one would always be better off with one faster (less
stringent) inspector. This is the intuitive explanation for the Proposition 1 result that   is lower AWS
when our port manager selects a small number of inspectors to inspect arriving ships less stringently.
In addition, the reader should note that the result contained in Proposition 1 is not based on general
distribution functions for either the interarrival times or the inspection times. Instead, this result is
based on Markovian distribution functions for the interarrival and the inspection times. A justification
for the use of these distribution functions has been given in section 2.1.
Given the significance of the problem of biological invasions, it is perhaps intuitively plausible
that our port manager ought to choose the inspection regime involving more stringent inspections and
a larger number of inspectors, i.e., the   inspection regime with inspection rate   However, M/M/2 γ.
using a larger number of more stringent inspectors imposes costs in the sense that the   regime M/M/213
stops all economic activity in our port for a relatively long period of time. We modeled these costs by
supposing that our port manager wishes to make the   criterion as small as possible. Our analysis AWS
thus far shows that there is a tension between   minimization and inspection stringency and that AWS
tension is this: If greater inspection stringency with a large number of inspectors is desired, then
economic costs measured by the   criterion will be relatively high. Conversely, if our port manager AWS
is willing to live with less stringent inspections with a smaller number of inspectors, then   will be AWS
relatively low. We now consider the choice of inspection regime question for an alternate criterion
function for our port manager.
4. The AWQ Criterion
We have already noted that the temporary stoppage of economic activities in our port imposes
costs on the economy of our coastal region. However, the   criterion is not the only criterion that AWS
we can use in thinking about these costs. Suppose we adopt a somewhat looser interpretation of these
costs and say that the loading and unloading of cargo may proceed on a ship that is currently being
inspected but that such activities may not take place on ships that have yet to be inspected, i.e., those
that are still in queue. In this way of looking at the problem, only ships that are in queue impose
economic costs. We shall refer to this looser criterion as the “average wait of a ship in queue” or
 criterion. The reader will note that in this looser interpretation of costs, once inspection on a AWQ
particular ship has commenced, there is a presumption of innocence rather than guilt. The basic
question before us now is this: Does the section 3 answer to our port manager’s inspection regime
choice question change when we adopt the   criterion? We now answer this question. AWQ
4.1. M/M/2 inspection regime
To compute   for the   inspection regime with rate   we begin by noting that AWQ M/M/2 γ,14




We now derive   for the  inspection regime with inspection rate  AWQ M/M/1 2γ.
4.2. M/M/1 inspection regime
In this case, the corresponding relationship between   and   is that AWQM/M/1 AWSM/M/1




Given equations (9) and (10), we are now in a position to discuss the central question of this paper
for the   criterion. AWQ
4.3. Discussion
To determine whether the section 3 answer to the choice of inspection regime question






We now invoke the section 3.3 assumption about the stability of the   inspection regime. Recall M/M/1
that this stability assumption is that the condition   holds. Using this stability assumption along 2γ>β
with equation (11), it is clear that   Therefore, we can now state AWQM/M/1>AWQM/M/2.15
PROPOSITION 2:   is lower when our port manager selects a large number of inspectors to AWQ
inspect arriving ships more stringently.
Given the salience of the problem of biological invasions, it makes intuitive sense that our port
manager ought to select the inspection regime with more stringent inspections and a larger number of
inspectors, i.e., the   regime with inspection rate   Proposition 2 tells us that this intuitive line M/M/2 γ.
of reasoning is correct when the port manager focuses on the   criterion. Proposition 2 also tells AWQ
us that the section 3 answer to the choice of inspection regime question does change when our port
manager focuses on the   criterion. This means that whether it is better to have a small number AWQ
of inspectors inspect arriving ships less stringently or have a large number of inspectors inspect the
same arriving ships more stringently depends on which economic cost criterion our port manager
adopts. 
More generally, there is a tension between economic cost reduction on the one hand and
biological damage control on the other. If total economic cost reduction is very important then the
port manager will focus on the stronger   criterion and this focus means that the chosen inspection AWS
regime will be relatively less stringent. In contrast, if biological damage control is very important, then
our port manager will select the more stringent   regime and, as we have just seen, this selection M/M/2
is optimal only when the manager concentrates on the weaker   criterion. AWQ
5. Conclusions
Maritime trade in goods by means of ships often results in injurious invasions of new habitats
by alien plant and animal species. Consequently, if an appropriate authority such as a port manager’s
objective is to prevent biological invasions, then this manager must inspect arriving ships for
potentially deleterious biological organisms. Given this state of affairs, what kind of inspection regime16
should this manager have in place? In particular, is it a better idea for this manager to have a small
number of inspectors inspect arriving ships less stringently or should this manager have a large number
of inspectors inspect the same ships more stringently? Our analysis shows that if decreasing economic
cost is significant then it makes more sense for the port manager to choose the inspection regime with
fewer inspectors and less stringent inspections. On the other hand, if reducing the damage from
biological invasions is more salient then the manager ought to pick the inspection regime with more
inspectors and more stringent inspections.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we
propose two potential extensions of this paper’s research. First, we analyzed the inspection regime
choice question in a very simple manner. Therefore, it would be instructive to study the properties of M/M/m
and   inspection models where   and   are positive integers,   and the inspection rates M/M/nm n m <n,
in the two models are different. Second, it would also be useful to eschew the assumption that the
inspection times are exponentially distributed and examine more general   and   inspection M/G/mM /G/n
models where   denotes a general distribution function. Studies of maritime trade driven biological G
invasions that incorporate these aspects of the inspection regime choice question into the analysis will
provide additional insights into a problem that has considerable economic and biological ramifications.17
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